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Discussion of “Are Related Party Transactions Red Flags?” 
 
BJORN N. JORGENSEN, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
JULIA MORLEY, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
ABSTRACT 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) create a new data set featuring two types of related 
party transactions. They use empirical-archival methods to investigate the effect of 
such transactions on the likelihood of restatements and on audit fees. Their findings 
suggest that related party transactions related to directors, officers and major 
shareholders are associated with poor “tone at the top” and that this leads 
management to negotiate for lower quality audits to minimize monitoring costs. To 
offer avenues for future research, we focus our discussion on three aspects of their 
paper related to causality, definitions of variables, and generalizability to non-US 
jurisdictions.  
 
1. Introduction 
In their paper, Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) (hereafter KM), analyze hand-collected 
data for listed US S&P 1500 firms for 2001, 2004 and 2007 to demonstrate that 
certain types of related party transactions (RPTs) are associated with a higher 
likelihood of financial restatement and, surprisingly, with a lower audit fee.1 The 
authors present two main findings. 
First, the occurrence of one specific type of related party transaction related to 
Directors, Officers and major Shareholders (which they label “RPT-DOS”) is 
indicative of an increased likelihood of financial restatement, although the RPT-DOS 
itself is not the cause of the accounting error which leads to the restatement. The 
authors find that restatements are associated with characteristics of both the company 
and auditor.  Independent variables in the model include auditor size, company 
growth rate, net assets and profit level. The variable RPT-DOS remains statistically 
significant even after the inclusion of proxies for corporate governance in the model. 
Based on the results of this statistical analysis, the authors make inferences about the 
reliability of RPT-DOS as an indicator of poor quality accounting.  Second, the 
authors find that firms with simple RPT-DOS are surprisingly associated with lower 
                                                 
1
 See Gordon et al. (2007) for a survey on related party transactions. 
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audit fees, which they attribute to lower demand for monitoring by management in 
companies with poor accounting quality.  
In terms of methodological choices, the authors sensibly apply standard 
econometric techniques. One example of a possible refinement might be the use of 
firm fixed effects, instead of their use of industry fixed effects (Gormley and Matsa, 
2014; Amir et al., 2016). Further, propensity score matching is increasingly used (see 
Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited, 2017). KM carefully acknowledge their choices but 
the literature still lacks guidance regarding when accurate inferences are derived from 
non-randomized experiments, with Shadish, Clark, and Steiner (2008) as a notable 
exception.  
The remainder of our discussion suggests three areas in which qualitative research 
can potentially supplement this empirical archival study. These relate to the 
interpretation of causality in the study, the definition of the variables included in the 
model, and cross-cultural applications of the findings. 
 
2. Causality 
In the red flag/restatement model, KM find an association between RPT-DOS and 
financial restatement, which they link to poor “tone at the top”.  Although this 
proposal is intuitively reasonable, further field-based research could provide evidence 
to support the underlying causal mechanisms at work. Qualitative researchers argue 
that field-based, and even interpretive, research can help enhance our understanding 
of causal relationships between variables (see Lukka, 2014, Miller and Power, 2013, 
and Power and Gendron, 2015).  When carried out in accordance with strict 
methodological criteria (Van der Stede, 2014), qualitative research can usefully 
enhance quantitative models and the specification of models (Chahed and Goh, 2016).  
In order to identify factors that might indicate the relationship between the presence 
of RPT-DOS and poor accounting quality, future field-based research could 
investigate the ex-ante process of authorization of RPTs, the attitude of management 
to RPTs and the view of managers in firms with RPTs on the value of high quality 
accounting, thereby illuminating the causal mechanisms at work in the observed 
association between RPT-DOS and poor accounting quality. 
A surprising result of the KH study is the observation that a RPT-DOS is 
associated with lower audit fee levels.  In the literature on auditing, a number of 
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participant and interview-based studies offer insights into the processes and 
motivations of those participating in audit practice. These studies reveal the ritualistic 
nature of audit work (Pentland, 1993), the role of audit committees (Gendron et al., 
2004), the effect of corporate governance regulation on staff retention issues within 
audit firms (Nagy and Cenker, 2007), the self-perception of the role of audit partners 
(McCracken et al., 2008), the implementation of auditing standards (Mennicken, 
2010) and the emotions experienced by auditors during an audit (Guénin-Paracini et 
al., 2014a,b).  Such interpretive methods can enhance the reliability of statistical 
analysis by examining the complexities of practice (Cooper and Morgan, 2008) that 
underlie the observed associations. 
 The KH findings are surprising because we would expect auditors to increase 
their audit effort when they observe RPT-DOSs as this increases the riskiness of the 
audit. Qualitative research could usefully address the process by which audit fees are 
set and the perceived relationship between audit fee, and audit quality (see for 
example, Francis, 2004). 
First, lower audit fees may be lower for reasons other than a demand for lower 
monitoring by the auditee management.  Possibilities include senior management 
negotiating harder for lower audit fees in anticipation of lower future profitability or a 
shift in the balance of bargaining power between the auditee and auditor.  Second, a 
lower audit fee may not be associated with lower audit quality.  Given that audit firms 
are liable to reputational damage in the case of a material misstatement (DeAngelo, 
1981; Barton, 2005; Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012), it seems unlikely that they would 
be willing carry out less work where a risk factor such as RPT-DOS is present. In the 
later years of the study, after the demise of Arthur Andersen, reputational issues and 
the presence of an audit committee would be expected to reduce the ability of the 
management team to negotiate for lower monitoring via a cut-price, low-quality audit.  
 Audit firm governance might also be worth exploring in future research, 
particularly with an investigation into the circumstances under which an audit partner 
would be capable of selling a low-quality, low-price audit to a high-risk client with an 
RPT-DOS. Field-based research could usefully investigate other factors, unrelated to 
audit quality, that might affect fee levels, for example geographical variations in 
location of the office that provides the audit (smaller regional offices might be 
expected to charge less than offices situated in a major city) or the negotiating 
strategy and success of individual audit partners.  
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 One significant issue not analyzed in the study is the mechanism through 
which material misstatements are discovered and reported. KM state that evidence of 
the mechanism by which the material misstatement was identified is not available 
from archival databases. Given the hypothesis that poor accounting and the existence 
of RPT-DOSs is the result of poor “tone at the top”, we would expect restatements to 
result from PCAOB reviews, or perhaps from a change to a new audit firm.  However, 
if the misstatement is discovered by the senior management of the corporation, the 
hypothesis that the association found is due to “tone at the top” is challenged.  
Similarly, if the existing auditor discovers the material misstatement and reports it, 
the hypothesis that a low quality audit is associated with low audit fees is also less 
obvious, since it would be self-defeating for an auditor to sell and then uncover its 
own low-quality work.  One possibility is that the auditor carried out more extensive 
audit work due to the higher perceived inherent and control risk of the audit as a result 
of the existence of the RPT-DOSs but that in some cases this did not result in the 
detection of a material misstatement until the following year. In this case, RPTs may 
be associated with an increased likelihood of restatement, not because of poorer 
reporting quality due to poor “tone at the top” but because RPT-DOSs are perceived 
by auditors as red flags and lead to greater scrutiny of the auditee.  Hence, additional 
work is needed to clarify the reason for the restatement and thereby the underlying 
causal mechanisms at work.  
 
3. Variables 
Much qualitative work in accounting has emphasized the need for a contextualized, 
interpretation of phenomena under investigation, taking into account the 
characteristics of the local environment and cultural norms at play (Hopwood, 1979, 
1983).  The relevance of a contextualized interpretation for this study concerns the 
fact that RPT-DOSs and material misstatements are treated as binary variables. In 
reality, what constitutes an RPT-DOS or a material misstatement is less clear-cut, 
particularly cross-jurisdictionally and over time.  Conceptual dynamism of this kind 
results from the following two factors: first, a changing environment influences how 
people interpret particular concepts. Second, as people respond to categorizations, 
they shift the meaning of the categories (Hacking, 1996).  For these reasons, the 
assumption that the two key variables included in the study are static over time may 
be mistaken.   
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 First, the term “related party transaction” is not only open to different 
interpretations but was in fact defined in different ways during the period of this 
study.  KM focus on the US market and identify related party transactions by 
reference to proxy statements and 10-K filings, assuming that RPTs are disclosed in 
proxy statements.  But this may not be the case as corporations can claim that 
amounts under $120,000 are non-material and need not be disclosed and also the 
information disclosed can vary between corporations (Min, 2014).  Furthermore, the 
authors note in footnote 9 that the cut-off for related party transactions increased from 
$60,000 to $120,000 in 2006, but do not discuss two other changes to the disclosure 
requirements in S404, which include the expansion of the definition of “immediate 
family members” to include step-family and the removal of instructions concerning 
materiality. The fact that the concepts included in the model do not necessarily remain 
fixed over the period generates noisiness in the data.  While qualitative work cannot 
resolve this data issue, interviews with CFOs, auditors and regulators may be useful in 
determining the extent to which these changes are a matter for significant concern. 
 Second, it is not clear that the term “material misstatement” can be treated as a 
binary variable legitimately. First, different kinds of material misstatement exist. A 
restatement relating to intangible assets that is perceived by users as inherently 
subjective may send a different signal to the market than a restatement of gross profit. 
Second, restatements are comparable between corporations and longitudinally only if 
the level of materiality is set consistently between companies.  Yet many scholars 
have argued that materiality is a negotiated concept (Sikka et al., 1998; Power, 1997).  
One corporation may be subject to a restatement because its auditors identify a 
misstatement in its financial statements to be material, whereas another, with an error 
of a similar magnitude, may not be subject to a restatement if its auditors have set a 
different level of materiality.  Evidence of the variation in materiality between 
corporations (and auditor firms) is observable in new long-form audit reports in the 
UK which require the disclosure of levels of materiality.2  
 Finally, field-based research could usefully disambiguate the term “tone at the 
top”. KM argue that poor “tone at the top” reflects the self-interest of management 
and is associated with the likelihood of restatement, even after controlling for general 
corporate governance factors.  Although existing research has highlighted the 
                                                 
2 These requirements are set out in ISA (UK and Ireland) 700, FRC (2013) and reviewed in a 2014 
report by Citi Research (Deans and Fisher, 2014). 
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importance of “tone at the top” for corporate governance and the quality of financial 
reporting, little has examined the associated firm-specific factors.3   In fact, “tone at 
the top” may not be amenable to rigorous quantitative analysis because of its nature of 
a subjective and context-dependent composite term, much like “risk management” 
(Power, 2004) or  “organisational culture” (Birkinshaw et al., 2011).  
 
4. Cross-jurisdictional applications 
The findings of the existing study have interesting implications for policy making, 
and could be extended to other jurisdictions. However, such an extension would 
demand a greater understanding of the regulatory and institutional environment in the 
new domains of application, not only because of differences in regulation but also 
enforcement (see for example, Licht et al., 2005; La Porta et al.; 2006; Leuz, 2010; 
Djankov et al., 2008; Jackson and Roe, 2009).  Related party transactions are 
regulated by listing regulations, corporate law, financial reporting regulation and 
auditing regulation. KM focus on the disclosures required by federal securities 
regulation for their study but do not take into account the effect of any changes in the 
interpretation of corporate law as reflects the ex-ante authorizations and ex-post 
disclosure of RPT-DOSs. While this may be acceptable for the case of the US, the 
interaction of listing requirements, corporate law, financial reporting and auditing 
guidelines will need to be addressed if the study is to be extended to other 
jurisdictions.  
 Consideration of a selection of jurisdictions outside the US reveals subtle 
variations in reporting and disclosure requirements.   
 
Canada: Two major regulatory authorities (Ontario and Quebec) use MI 61-101 to 
regulate RPTs.  Unlike the US SEC, which focuses solely on disclosure for RPTs, the 
Canadian listing requirements require majority approval by minority shareholders and 
independent valuations for certain transactions.  In part, the greater focus on related 
party transactions in Canada is associated with a higher proportion of public 
companies in Canada that are controlled by a single shareholder or group of 
                                                 
3 But, see Schwartz et al. (2005) and Weber (2010) who identify “tone” (in a US environment) with 
general moral leadership manifested in a number of different types of behaviours and norms within the  
company.  By contrast, other researchers have identified “tone at the top” with management -specific 
factors such as CFO’s ability and age (e.g., Baik et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012). 
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shareholders (25%) compared with the US (8%).4 
Australia: Under Chapter 2E of the Corporations Act, a company must obtain 
shareholder approval to give a financial benefit to a related party. The Australian 
Securities & Investments Commission (ASIC) offers guidance on the circumstances 
in which an independent expert's report is expected to be distributed to members. 
RG76 provides for the disclosure of all related party arrangements to shareholders. 
There is no specific cut-off for materiality and instead the ‘inconsequential’ 
transactions must be disclosed to shareholders. ASIC does not define 
‘inconsequential’. 
China: The Shanghai Stock Exchange does not permit loans to directors, supervisors 
or senior officers either directly or indirectly. Disclosure should be made of RPTs 
with natural persons for values over RMB 300,000 and to legal persons over RMB 3 
million or 0.5% of the value of the company’s net assets.  However, the Chinese 
government is a related party for many listed companies, which were initially carved 
out of state organizations. This has resulted in an amendment to IAS 24 in 2008 to 
exclude government holdings from required disclosures under the standard. 
India: Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India (SEBI, LC49) has recently been aligned with the Companies Act (Cos Act, 
2013). All RPTs require audit committee approval and RPTs not in the ordinary 
course of business and not at arm’s length require board approval. Additionally, 
approval by the company is required through a special resolution by disinterested 
shareholders for transactions exceeding specified thresholds.  
Italy: Material RPTs are those for which the transaction value exceeds 5% of the 
higher of the shareholders’ equity and the market capitalization, or 2.5% for a 
company controlled by another listed company. For these, management must 
circularise shareholders giving a description and the key terms of the RPT and these 
must also be disclosed in the half-yearly annual report. Approval is by a committee of 
unrelated directors, who have veto power for material RPTs.  
UK: For companies with a premium listing on the London Stock Exchange, RPTs 
                                                 
4 https://www.cpacanada.ca/business-and-accounting-resources/strategy-risk-and-goverance/corporate-
governance/publications/controlled-companies-what-directors-should-know 
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must be disclosed. In addition, any loan of more than £10,000 must be approved by 
shareholders according to the UK Companies Act.  
Figure 1 summarizes the different regulation covering RPT-DOSs for six jurisdictions 
in addition to the US.  For all of these, legislation and listing regulations require at 
least ex-post disclosure of RPTs and, for many, certain RPTs such as loans to 
directors are either prohibited (US, China) or subject to ex-ante approval (UK). 
 Aside from regulatory issues, cultural factors also need to be considered for 
cross-jurisdictional applications.  The quality of RPT-DOS as an indicator of poor 
“tone at the top” may vary in strength between different cultures. Outside the US, 
RPT-DOSs may be more common in which case they may be less likely to be 
associated with control weaknesses and more likely to be related to local social 
norms. In some cultures where capital markets are less efficient than in the US, 
transactions with related parties may reflect a means of reducing transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937), although admittedly, this is more likely to be the case for business-
related RPTs than the RPT-DOS identified in the KM study. Nevertheless, in different 
regulatory and tax environments, we may expect RPT-DOSs to occur for short 
periods – for example as a tax efficient way of transferring funds to a shareholder 
when dividends are likely to be highly taxed. In these cases, the status of RPT-DOS as 
a red flag may be questioned.  
 Another factor that may affect the implications of RPT-DOS for accounting 
quality is variation in firm-ownership characteristics between countries. Differences 
in the concentration of ownership may vary between countries. Furthermore, variation 
in other ownership characteristics, such as the nature of dominant shareholders and 
ownership structure, may affect the extent to which related party transactions count as 
red flags.  Family ownership, control rights, cash-flow rights and pyramidal 
ownership structures all affect risk of tunneling. Family-owned companies have been 
shown to be less likely to smooth income than non-family-controlled companies 
because family owners can mitigate the agency problem due to their ability to monitor 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) or to take on the role of managers themselves 
and tend to report better quality earnings (Ali et al., 2007).  Furthermore, family 
owners may have objectives beyond mere economic self-interest (Bubolz, 2001) but 
may place family-affiliated insiders in senior management positions (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  Concentration of ownership in the US is relatively low as is family 
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ownership. Family controlled listed US companies were 34% of the S&P (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003), and 45% of Fortune 1000 firms (Miller et al., 2007).  
 Let us consider, for example, corporate ownership in Canada, Italy and China. 
Corporate ownership in Canada is more concentrated than in the United States and 
uses multiple classes of voting shares and pyramidal structures more frequently (Attig 
2005; Morck, Stangeland and Yeung, 2000).  Studies of large Canadian companies 
find that over half the companies feature concentrated ownership, with families being 
the most common block-holder.  Family-owners are more likely to use dual-class 
shares and pyramidal structures (Buckley, 1997; Attig, 2005; Morck et al., 2005), 
which may be associated with negative consequences for earnings management and 
accounting quality. Studies of Canadian companies have been inconclusive about the 
effect on performance of family ownership, although a recent Bank of Canada report 
does not find that concentrated ownership, whether by a corporation or financial 
institution, is associated with any change in performance.  However, valuations of 
family-owned firms with dual-class shares are on average 17% lower relative to 
widely-held firms (King and Santor, 2008). 
In Italy, an even higher proportion of listed companies have a single dominant 
shareholder or affiliated shareholders (Bianchi, Bianco and Enriques, 2001). Precipe 
et al. (2014) found that 70% of a sample of listed Italian companies were family 
controlled, which is consistent with earlier work by Corbetta and Minichilli (2005) 
which found that 67% of non-financial companies in Italy were family-controlled in 
2003. Studies have found that family control is associated with reduced income 
smoothing for Italian listed companies (Prencipe et al., 2011). 
For Chinese companies the state is often a dominant shareholder.  
Furthermore, even outside China, a concentration of ownership is higher in Asian 
companies (E&Y, 2014). Based on data for 2012, the report states that approximately 
75% of issuers on the HKSE have a dominant shareholder who owns 30% or more of 
the issued shares.  There is also a high level of connected transactions, mainly 
between the issuers and their major shareholder groups, which represent about 75% of 
the connected transactions disclosed in 2011.  
These inter-jurisdictional differences in concentration and characteristics of 
ownership and control suggest that applying the KM model internationally, may 
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require an appreciation of the effects of the local ownership and control environment.  
Where family ownership mitigates agency issues, related party transactions with 
family members may exert the same effect on reporting quality as was found in the 
US. Further work could usefully identify relationships between RPT-DOS and 
earnings quality in jurisdictions with different ownership and control structures. 
With regards to the audit fee model, cross-cultural variations in audit practice 
would need to be incorporated into the study if it were to be applied cross-
jurisdictionally. Following the original work by Hofstede (1980), many studies have 
revealed that culture-specific factors may affect audit practice (for example, Cohen et 
al., 2010 and Parboteeah et al., 2005).  Cultural studies have focused on the auditor’s 
willingness to accede to client demands (Patel et al., 2002) and the likelihood of 
accounting errors in client accounts (Chan et al., 2003). Also, differences in ethical 
standards and the competence of accounting professionals may vary between 
jurisdictions along with organizational structures (Parboteeah et al., 2005).  
International variation in cultural and ethical norms may result in different levels of 
detection of misstatement and different fee negotiating practices. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2017) study finds that simple RPT-DOSs are red flags 
for poor accounting quality associated with lower audit fees. The authors develop a 
model to explain these observations, suggesting that RPT-DOS is associated with 
poor “tone at the top” and that this leads management to negotiate for lower quality 
audits to minimize monitoring costs. Qualitative, field-based research may contribute 
to the refinement of the model by highlighting potentially relevant variables that may 
have been omitted as well as disambiguating complex variables such as “tone at the 
top” to make them more tractable.  Furthermore, field-based research into practice, 
both within the finance function of corporations and within audit practice, could 
contribute by revealing the motivations of agents whose actions drive the observed 
statistical outcomes. Finally, the application of this model to test whether RPT-DOS 
is a signal of accounting quality in different cultures would be welcome. 
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Figure 1: RPT-DOS Regulation 
 
 Listing Rules Listing requirements for RPT-DOS Accounting 
regulation 
US Federal Securities Law SOX 402, 
404 (2002) and 407 (2006) 
 
 
Loans to directors banned, RPTs 
over 
$120k to be included on proxy 
statement (after 2006 ($60k before) 
SFAS 57 
Canada Collection of regulators (CSA:10 
provincial & 3 territorial). 
Multilateral Instrument (MI) 61-
101, Protection of Minority Security 
Holders in Special Transactions 
applies in Ontario and Quebec  
(covering most large Canadian 
listings). 
Majority approval of minority 
shareholders for related party 
transactions, with exemptions for 
transactions in the normal course of 
business or business combinations 
(Section 5.6). 
IAS 24  
(or Canadian 
GAAP 
Section 
3850) 
Australia Australian Securities & Investments 
Commission (ASIC) Regulatory 
Guide 76 Related party transactions 
(RG76) 
Disclosure and independent report 
– for all RPTs that are not 
`inconsequential’. 
IAS 24  
China Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Committee 
Shanghai: loans to directors not 
permitted. Material related party 
transactions are disclosed. 
IAS 24  
India Listing Agreement, Clause 49 All RPTs require audit committee 
approval and all material RPTs 
require shareholder approval. 
Ind. AS 24 
(disclosure) 
Italy CONSOB Article 2391-bis (2004)  
 
Material RPTs  are those for which 
the transaction value exceeds 5% of 
the higher of the shareholders’ 
equity and the market capitalization 
(or 2.5% for a company controlled 
by another listed company) 
Circularization of shareholders and 
approval by a committee of 
unrelated directors for material 
RPTs. 
IAS 24 
UK UK Listing Rules, LR11 
 
 
Circularization of shareholders and 
approval of RPTs 
IAS 24  
 
 
 
